It was a bit surprising, then, when Jackson placed originalism and textualism at the heart of her judicial philosophy on Tuesday. She told Democratic Sen. Dick Durbin that, when interpreting the Constitution, “I am focusing on original public meaning because I’m constrained to interpret the text.” This “adherence to the text,” she explained, “is a constraint on my authority.”

A few minutes later, Jackson reiterated this view to Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley, disavowing any belief in a “living Constitution” that evolves with the times. “I do not believe that there is a living Constitution,” she said, “in the sense that it’s changing and it’s infused with my own policy perspective or the policy perspective of the day. Instead, the Supreme Court has made clear that when you’re interpreting the Constitution you’re looking at the text at the time of the founding.”

In a later colloquy with Republican Sen. Mike Lee, Jackson hit this point once more. “The Supreme Court now very clearly has determined that, in order to interpret provisions of the Constitution, we look to the time of the founding and we ascertain based on what the original public meaning of the words of the Constitution were at the time.” When recognizing a fundamental right not enumerated in the Constitution, she elaborated, a judge must look to “history,” as well as the “practices” of the American people. This answer echoes conservative originalists’ use of “history and tradition” to identify liberties implied by the Constitution’s text.

In case her position wasn’t plain enough, Jackson also distanced herself from another bugaboo of the conservative legal movement: a reliance on international law when interpreting the Constitution. Some liberal and moderate justices—including Jackson’s former boss, Stephen Breyer—occasionally look to international law to glean “the opinion of the world community.” This information may support the court’s conclusion that there is a broad societal consensus against, for instance, executing juvenile offenders or criminalizing sodomy. Conservatives like Scalia despise any gesture toward international law as a perversion of the U.S. Constitution.

Grassley therefore sought to put Jackson in a tough spot when he asked her: “Do you think it’s appropriate to look to international law when interpreting enumerated and unenumerated constitutional rights?” Yet the nominee did not hesitate: “No, Senator,” she said. So Grassley tried again: “What specific constitutional clauses or rights,” he asked, “has the Supreme Court held can be interpreted by looking to international law?” Jackson responded: “I’m not aware of any that are properly illuminated by reference to international law.”

That isn’t quite right, since the Supreme Court has explicitly affirmed the use of international law when analyzing the Eighth Amendment. But it was a shrewd answer. Jackson knows that this Supreme Court will never look to other nations’ laws when expounding the Constitution. And she has nothing to gain from defending this doomed approach to judging. So she threw Breyer under the bus, disclaiming his pet project without hesitation. (The man wrote a whole book on the subject!)

Jackson’s rhetorical turn to the right pleased many of her Republican critics. The Washington Examiner’s Quin Hillyer wrote that she sounded “almost like a conservative’s dream nominee,” adding: “Even liberals are now arguing within parameters set by jurists” like Scalia. National Review’s Dan McLaughlin published two pieces cheering Jackson’s repudiation of “progressive pieties.” Talk radio figure Ross Kaminsky lauded her “originalist principles,” speculating that she might be “as good a nominee as conservatives/libertarians could hope for from this president.” Ed Whelan, implacable foe of KBJ, tweeted that she was “validating conservative judicial principles.” The upshot is that Jackson’s testimony signals a victory for the conservative legal movement—proof that even liberal judges must play by conservatives’ rules.